House Communications Advances Future Networks Act, 3 China Security Bills
The House Communications Subcommittee unanimously advanced the Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act (HR-820), Future Uses of Technology Upholding Reliable and Enhancing Networks Act (HR-1513) and two other anti-China communications security bills Tuesday. House China Committee Chairman Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., meanwhile, is pressing the FCC on whether it will act on reports that mobile devices in the U.S. are still processing signals from China’s BeiDou and Russia’s global navigation satellite systems (GNSS).
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House Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers, R-Wash., and other Communications members said the four measures help counter the risk Chinese government-backed companies pose to the security of U.S. networks. The other measures on the docket: the Countering CCP Drones Act (HR-2864) and Removing Our Unsecure Technologies to Ensure Reliability and Security Act (HR-7589). All four bills drew positive reviews during a February House Communications hearing (see 2402150068). Lawmakers in both parties again emphasized their push for Congress to allocate an additional $3.08 billion to close a funding shortfall for the FCC’s Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program (see 2402140055). House Commerce ranking member Frank Pallone (N.J.) again touted Democrats’ push for stopgap funding for the FCC’s affordable connectivity program (see 2402130074) as another priority for securing U.S. networks.
The U.S. “faces exceedingly complex threats from China and other adversaries that require a comprehensive and coordinated response” to “serious concerns about the level of influence and potential for exploitation” by companies under the influence of those countries’ governments, Rodgers said. “This response must include efforts to secure critical supply chains, protect our allies, strengthen cybersecurity defenses, and engage in strategic competition with China in key technologies.” The markup occurred ahead of a planned Wednesday House vote on the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (HR-7521), which would ban U.S. distribution of TikTok and other ByteDance-owned apps unless the company divests them (see 2403120062).
The Chinese government “poses a significant threat to American security and economic leadership,” including its bid to overtake the U.S. “as the global leader in communications and technology,” said House Communications Chairman Bob Latta, R-Ohio. “Given the known vulnerabilities and many technologies produced by companies with ties to the CCP, it is imperative to take steps to mitigate the widespread availability of this equipment.”
Pallone and other lawmakers praised HR-1513, which would direct the FCC to establish a 6G task force that provides recommendations about ensuring U.S. leadership in developing that technology’s standards. House Communications voted 23-0 to advance the measure, which the chamber passed during the last Congress (see 2112020050). “As the next generation of technology is developed, we must understand the potential risks to best protect our networks and strengthen the technology’s design,” Pallone said.
HR-1513 lead sponsor House Communications ranking member Doris Matsui, D-Calif., said the U.S. needs “to be taking steps to prepare for the next generation of networks, because the economic and national security stakes in the global race to 6G couldn't be higher. As China leans on Huawei and other big companies to advance its interests in international standards-setting bodies, the U.S. needs to stay vigilant and engaged.”
House Communications voted 22-0 to advance an amended version of HR-820, which would require the FCC to publish a list of communications companies with FCC licenses or other authorizations in which China and other foreign adversaries’ governments hold at least a 10% ownership stake (see 2210250067). Rep. Rick Allen, R-Ga., said his substitute amendment “would incorporate technical assistance from the FCC and others to ensure that this bill can be implemented according to its intent.”
Subcommittee members similarly advanced 21-0 an amended version of HR-2864, which would add Chinese drone manufacturer Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI) to the FCC’s covered entities list. Lead sponsor Rep. August Pfluger, R-Texas, said his substitute amendment to the measure would allow for a more “comprehensive” ban on DJI technology, including software. “Removing these drones is essential for our national security,” he said. Pfluger’s amendment appears to respond to concerns Rodgers voiced during the February hearing about HR-2864’s scope.
House Communications voted 23-0 on HR-7521, which would direct the Commerce Department to “specify what transactions involving routers, modems, or devices that combine a modem and a router are prohibited” under then-President Donald Trump’s 2019 executive order, which bars transactions involving information and communications technologies that pose an “undue risk of sabotage to or subversion of” U.S.-based communications services (see 1905150066). Latta, the bill’s lead sponsor, later hailed its advancement as a way to “do more” to counter Chinese equipment vendors to follow up on the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act.
Gallagher said his office has “become aware that U.S. mobile phones and other connected devices are receiving and processing signals from” BeiDou and GONASS “in violation of the FCC’s rules” requiring certification of any foreign GNSS. “To date, only the European Galileo GNSS has been approved,” he said in a letter to FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel released Tuesday. “It appears one reason that carriers and device and component manufacturers are using these unauthorized signals is that” the U.S. “is woefully behind in its deployment and activation of its next generation of GPS satellites. However, Galileo provides access to a full constellation of the most advanced GNSS technologies and is operated by our close allies in the European Union. As such, there is little need for the FCC to waive its own rule to allow U.S. devices to use unauthorized foreign signals.”
Gallagher wants Rosenworcel's response by April 15 to questions about “unauthorized GNSS signals in the U.S.,” including whether the commission is “aware of any mobile handsets or other devices operating in the U.S. that receive and process signals from GNSS constellations that have not been authorized.” He wants to know whether the FCC has “taken any steps to enforce its rules concerning reception and processing of unauthorized GNSS signals” and why the commission hasn’t approved other foreign constellations besides Galileo.