GAO Reports on Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, Says Cost May Not be Justified

(The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is testing new ASP radiation detection monitors and expects them to reduce both the risk of missed threats and the rate of innocent alarms, which DNDO considers to be key limitations of radiation detection equipment currently used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection at U.S. ports of entry.)

Congress has required that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security certify that ASPs provide a significant increase in operational effectiveness before obligating funds for full-scale procurement. GAO was asked to review the degree to which DHS' criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness address the limitations of existing radiation detection equipment and the rigor of ASP testing and preliminary test results, etc.

GAO Found ASPs Have Limited Ability to Detect Shielded Nuclear Materials, Etc.

According to GAO, it found the following when conducting its review:

"Significant increase" criteria. GAO found that the DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness require a minimal improvement in the detection of threats and a large reduction in innocent alarms. Specifically, the criteria require a marginal improvement in the detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear materials, considered to be a key limitation of current-generation portal monitors.

Innocent alarms. With regard to innocent alarms, the other key limitation of current equipment, meeting the criteria could result in hundreds fewer innocent alarms per day, thereby reducing CBP's workload and delays to commerce. DHS increased the rigor of ASP testing in comparison with previous tests. However, the testing still had limitations, such as a limited set of scenarios used in performance testing to conceal test objects from detection. Moreover, the preliminary results are mixed.

Limited ability to detect shielded nuclear materials. The results show that the new portal monitors have a limited ability to detect certain nuclear materials at anything more than light shielding levels: ASPs performed better than current-generation portal monitors in detection of such materials concealed by light shielding approximating the threat guidance for setting detection thresholds, but differences in sensitivity were less notable when shielding was slightly below or above that level.

Port operation integration problems. Testing also uncovered multiple problems in ASPs meeting the requirements for successful integration into operations at ports of entry. CBP officials anticipate that, if ASPs are certified, new problems will appear during the first few years of deployment in the field.

GAO Concludes That Costs of ASPs Might Not be Justified, Etc.

In the report, GAO provides the following conclusions from its review of the ASPs:

Cost may not be justified. Given that radiation detection equipment is already being used at ports of entry to screen for smuggled nuclear or radiological materials, the decision whether to replace existing equipment requires that the benefits of the new portal monitors be weighed against the costs. DNDO acknowledges that ASPs are significantly more expensive than current-generation portal monitors to deploy and maintain, and based on preliminary results from the 2008 testing, it is not yet clear that the $2 billion cost of DNDO's deployment plan is justified.

ASPs not expected to detect shielded materials better. Even if ASPs are able to reduce the volume of innocent cargo referred for secondary screening, they are not expected to detect certain nuclear materials that are surrounded by a realistic level of shielding better than current-generation portal monitors could. Preliminary results of DNDO's performance testing show that ASPs outperformed the current-generation portal monitors in detection of such materials during runs with light shielding, but ASPs' performance rapidly deteriorated once shielding was slightly increased.

Furthermore, officials acknowledged that the performance of both portal monitors in detecting such materials with a moderate amount of shielding would be similarly poor.

GAO Recommends that DHS Assess ASPs, Revise Program Schedule

GAO recommends that DHS (1) assess ASPs against the full potential of current equipment and (2) revise the program schedule to allow time to conduct computer simulations of ASPs' capabilities and to uncover and resolve problems with ASPs before full-scale deployment.

DHS agreed to a phased deployment that should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with GAO's recommendation to assess whether ASPs meet the criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness based on a comparison with the full potential of current equipment. GAO believes its recommendation remains valid.

(See ITT's Online Archives or 10/29/08 news, 08102925, for BP summary of earlier GAO report on ASPs.

See ITT's Online Archives or 09/05/07 news, 07090505, for BP summary on a request by various Senators asking the DHS Secretary to hold off on acquisition of ASP radiation monitors until questions about their reliability, performance, and effectiveness have been addressed.)

GAO report, "Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS' Program to Procure and Deploy Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the Department's Previous Cost Estimates" (GAO-09-655, dated May 2009) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09655.pdf